Question:
When did you begin working as a mediator with CRS?

Answer:
In March of 1972.

Question:
What were you doing prior to joining CRS?

Answer:
Just prior to CRS I was a senior budget analyst for Model Cities in New York City. That was sort of an intern job. But prior to that, I was a deputy director of a community action agency in New York City and did organizing around community-based issues including education and economics. We had some neighborhood youth core programs. This was one of your standard CAP [Community Action Program] agencies back in the old days.

Question:
What was it that attracted you to CRS?

Answer:
Part of it was that I was looking for a job. At the CAP agency, when I was just a volunteer doing tenant organizing in the lower west side of New York, the person who recruited me was Wallace Warfield. He left the CAP agency to work for CRS in 1968. So a mutual acquaintance of ours told me that they had some openings and that I ought to give Wally a call and find out about it. I did and found out they were looking for an education specialist. I was just finishing my master's degree in urban education and applied for the job and got it and was thrilled. But, the clearance process took a long time, so while I was waiting and I really did need a job at that point that's when I started working at Model Cities as a budgeting person. You'd never know that now, because Lord knows, budget is not my strong suit. But I did a good job for them while I was there.

Question:
Give us an idea of how you became involved in a certain case. What did you do, why did you do it, and those types of things. Also, give us the background for it.

Answer:
Ok, this was a case of a national company that had a history of not being trusted by segments of some minority communities. In fact, there had been boycotts specifically organized against this company. There was an occasion where an official from that company made some statements at a public event which were seen as particularly outrageous by the community. That sort of renewed the need for something to happen in terms of the relationship between that company and the minority community. There were some discussions taking place locally and on a national basis, and our agency was able to coordinate, or facilitate, a collaboration among a number of minority organizations that were interested. They all had an interest in trying to approach this particular company, and the company was willing to at least explore the possibility of meeting with this national level coalition to address some of the issues and concerns that had been raised. Some of our national staff helped to make some of the national contacts, but we in this region were the ones that actually worked it. I co-mediated that with Leo Cardenas who was a regional director. We were the ones who went on with the logistics of actually pulling together this coalition of minority organizations, arranging the first meeting with the company, and doing pre-mediation work.

Question:
Ok. So from that point, did CRS take it upon themselves to go to the various minority communities, or did the minority communities approach CRS?

Answer:
I think it was a little of both. CRS is one of the few federal agencies that doesn't need an invitation or a request for assistance to get involved. We can go in under our own motion. In this case, there were some discussions taking place nationally, and to be honest with you, I am not sure whether we first approached the organization or whether the organization approached CRS. It was sort of a mutual acknowledgment that this made sense. We certainly helped once an interest was expressed in pulling together, and we helped those organizations that were interested in forming a coalition.

Question:
So it sounds like most parties, or all the parties, were interested in becoming involved in working out some of the differences.

Answer:
Right.

Question:
Was there any party that was opposed to CRS being involved?

Answer:
There was another minority organization coalition that formed on its own around the same time. They decided they would prefer to approach and negotiate with this company on their own without CRS assistance. However, the other group that I'm referring to welcomed CRS assistance and the role that CRS played.

Question:
Did it cause a problem to have this independent group operating sort of in parallel?

Answer:
It did not for us. I think down the road, the company was concerned that they were carrying out two negotiations at the same time. They were concerned that one group might have the perception that the other group got a better deal. So in fact, as it came close to a formalized agreement, I think they took pains to make sure that they would not face a situation where they had to explain to one party what the provisions were in the other agreement.

Question:
Did CRS feel any additional pressure having an outside group involved?

Answer:
I don't think so. One of the things I have learned as I'm responding to any conflict in a community is that it's never the entire community that's prepared to negotiate, that's prepared to sit at the table. So I have learned to go with those parties that are willing to participate and use that as at least a starting point. I made it very clear that any agreement would have to be limited to what these parties could agree to, and in fact when I do mediation training, that's always one of the things that I emphasize. As you bring parties to the table, make sure that everybody understands what kinds of commitments those parties at the table can make and whom they represent. Just because it's a Black organization for instance, or a Hispanic organization, or a Native American or Asian organization, does not mean that they represent that entire community. So make sure that it's clear at the beginning who they represent and for whom they can make commitments. In this case, it was a particular segment who represented particular organizations, and they could speak for those organizations. The fact that there might be others out there who were negotiating as well or who had other grievances, I did not see that as pressure.

Question:
So that didn't effect the job that you were doing?

Answer:
I don't think so, no.

Question:
Once this came to your attention and CRS decided to become involved, what was the next step? Who did you initiate contact with, or how did you initiate contact?

Answer:
I don't remember. Again, I think some of the initial contact was made out of our national office in consultation with our regional director. So when I actually got involved in this case, I was in meeting with the minority coalition. Right now I'm talking about the whole mediation process, sort of what I would call a pre-mediation session, and how that would work, and what the procedures would be, and making sure that they're together. You're all here in the same city at the same time. I needed to make sure that mediation was still a process that made sense to them and that they, indeed, wanted to use our mediation services in pursuing this. I also had a similar meeting with the company to make sure that they had that same understanding.

Question:
So you provided advance notice to both parties? Was there any party that was uninformed that you were becoming involved?

Answer:
No, not really. Not that I am aware of.

Question:
Was most of the contact done by phone, or did you meet in person?

Answer:
It was a lot of both. Initially, we had personal meetings with the coalition all meeting together in the same room. Then we had meetings with officials from the company. Then we had the first joint meeting after some basic explanation of what mediation is and so on. Because this was a coalition which consisted of top leaders and executives from around the country, we ended up doing a lot of telephoning, discussion, negotiation, and exploration of options in between face-to- face meetings.

Question:
How did you decide how to prepare for this particular case? How did you come up with your game plan, so to speak? Is it something that's standard with each case that comes to your attention?

Answer:
Typically, when I approach a new mediation case, before I even bring the parties together, I try to find out what the specific needs and interests of each party are, what is it that they hope to get out of this, and why. This way, I have some sense of where the common denominators are and where we're going to have some problems before we actually bring them together. So I do a lot of ground work with the parties before I ever get them to the table. I'm not necessarily referring to this particular case, but I don't like bringing parties to the table without knowing what's going to happen. I hate surprises. So if I don't think that there's at least some area where they're going to be able to reach some agreement, or some understanding, I typically keep them apart. If anything, I do shuttle diplomacy because I don't want this first experience of actually eyeballing each other to be one of further conflict and disappointment and failure.

Question:
So do you start working them toward a consensus?

Answer:
In at least some area, yes. I do a lot of what I call shuttle diplomacy.

Question:
You actually get the idea of what the interests and issues are of one side. Then, do you go to the other side and say, "This is what they are thinking?"

Answer:
No, no. I don't ever do that. I let them do that at the table, I just try to find out what their interests and needs are and where the flexibility is. Sometimes I might ask some "what if" questions. What is your reaction to this concept and what do you need in this and so on. But I don't try to become a messenger for the parties. On the contrary, I avoid that. Even if we're in a mediation session and we're at the table, you always make sure there's a room for caucuses. If I caucus with one party or the other, before we go back into the room, one of things I make sure is determined is, "Okay, which of you is going to bring this back to the table, because I shouldn't be the person." I am strictly seen as the mediator, rather than a messenger for either party. So I make a specific, conscious effort to not become the messenger. The closest thing to being a messenger might be if there is, in fact, a proposal made and I try to estimate what their reaction would be. I would say, "I don't know, but let me check, okay?" Then, even if I am not sure if that's going to work, I try not to actually deliver the message per se.

Question:
How often did you try not to put yourself in that situation, but then stuff happens?

Answer:
Not terribly often. There's something that's so interesting in mediating civil rights issues, or mediating with a party from a minority community. There have been so many times when I've gone and as I meet with the minority community to explore whether this might be a mediation case, or even just to get ready for a mediation case, I don't set any time limits. I just assume that it's going to take a long time. I don't make hour appointments for that and most of the time I end up being bombarded with what probably is like years, if not five generations, of frustration.

Question:
How do you open this up? What questions do you ask to get this going?

Answer:
Just, "What's the conflict here?" Usually I am there because something has happened or somebody has issued a petition. So I just say, "Okay, so tell what this is about." One of the questions that I have learned is, "When did this happen?" I am thinking of a case of police use of force in Indian country. As I met with the minority community, I heard horror stories of the kinds of beatings that had taken place and abuse of citizens and so on. The first time, I was overwhelmed. They were all terrible. Then I found out that some of them had taken place 15 years ago. "It happened to my son who is now in college." That doesn't make it any less important. I am not minimizing the relevance of that, but I did learn to ask, "When did this happen?" instead of just assuming. My mindset at first was like, "Tell me what happened." I would hear the stories assuming that it had happened at least within the last year. But what I am hearing isn't just what happened in the last year, but the whole history of this. So when I asked, "When did it happen?" in that case, I tried to make sure that they didn't feel what happened twenty years ago wasn't important, but as we get closer to the actual joint meeting, it's important to know what the long term history is and what's happened more recently. But it's an angry setting. I see the anger and the frustration and sometimes hopelessness that this community is experiencing, because they really don't know what to do with it. Again, at first we say, "oh god. I hope I can get these people to the table, I hope I can keep this under control." And a few days later, I get these same people at the table. I remember at least one situation where I ended up calling a caucus and talking to the minority group. "What happened to all the anger?" It isn't that I want them to lose their temper, but to some extent, I want the other party to recognize how much hurt and frustration is there. I'll ask them, "what about all of those points you had made to me? Who is going to raise that?" Once they get to the table, and they have gotten a lot of the emotion out of their system. I was amazed the first few time at how calm they were. I don't want to say they were reasonable, because sometimes for me it's reasonable for them to be very angry. It would unreasonable to be calm, controlled, soft-spoken, once they got to the actual mediation process.

Question:
Did you coach them at all in that, or is this something they specifically do on their own?

Answer:
A little bit of both. I try to coach them to be clear, to present their needs, and to state their position. I start with, "What do you think is important for the other party to know? Who's going to say that? Who's going to present that?" I also tell both sides that part of my role as mediator is to control the process, and that I'm not going to let it get out of control. They also need to understand that there are some emotions here and there is some anger here and that is part of what we're here for, but to trust me, that I'll keep it under control. So far I've been able to do that. It's more than just coaching on how to be calm participants. It's an approach that they themselves pick up and use. Again I've not always seen that happen. I've seen it enough times to sort of almost marvel at the change in presentation. It's not a change in outlook, but it's a change in presentation. I think probably they're wanting to be seen as people who are sincere and wanting to work this out, so they believe that they need to appear to be reasonable, controlled and organized in making their presentation. So yes, I do some preparation towards that, but it's more than that, it's more than just good pre-mediation training. To some extent I admire them because we had very sophisticated people on both sides, as opposed to the more grassroots leadership that I frequently work with. That degree of sophistication means we still made some preparation. We make sure we work with both sides so that they recognized what their specific needs were and what some of the options and alternatives might be. We didn't do the kind of basic role playing that I might with a more grassroots party.

Question:
Going back to your initial case, how did you approach the company?

Answer:
Very carefully. The company was not as open to having us participate in their caucuses. I think they were more apprehensive about what exactly our role would be, and even though they agreed to it right from the get go, I think it took some time before they, in their own minds, acknowledged our impartiality. I think the fact we were from the Justice Department, but we would talk about being a part of the Civil Rights Act, and so the hidden messages I think was that they were not convinced initially that we were totally impartial.

Question:
They let you know that? Did they say that?

Answer:
No, they did not tell us that. I wish they had, because then we could've discussed it. There were times when they clearly wanted to caucus strictly on their own, and more often than not they did not want us in there. I am not sure that they were quite clear yet whether or not they could trust us.

Question:
They thought you were spying?

Answer:
Yes. Or we were civil rights advocates. Even though we were a biracial team, I think their initial inclination was to be suspicious. What is interesting though, was that once the agreement was signed and there was considerable publicity surrounding this, we had the occasion to meet with one of the officials who had been involved in the negotiation from the company. He mentioned that he was getting calls from other companies. In essence, these other companies were saying, "God, we saw what happened. Can you give us any advice on how we can avoid this? How we can stay out of this?" His reaction to these companies was, "you don't want to avoid it. This mediation process is one of the best things we've ever done. You ought to pursue it." That's why I say there was a change. Even though they may have been a little apprehensive at first, by the end of the process, they were absolutely sold on the idea of using mediation.

Question:
What did you do to reduce the initial distrust from the corporations?

Answer:
Good question. Even though we might not have been part of their private caucuses, we did meet with them in caucus. So that part of it was their realization that we kept our confidence when we said we would. I think they began to recognize that kind of shuttle diplomacy, and in this case, not just shuttle diplomacy but shuttle telephone diplomacy, that we were facilitating, was in fact bringing the two parties closer. I think they began to see our even handedness, that we didn't try to push them or pressure them into accepting deals or making agreements with which they were uncomfortable. The more time we spent on this, the more they began to realize that we were, in fact, facilitating and not trying to coerce them into accepting the position being presented by the other party and vice versa.

Question:
Can you give us the general interests of each party?

Answer:
Yes. Employment by the company was an issue. What vendors or contractors they use, to the extent to which minorities were included in that? They also had branches elsewhere, and to what extent were those managed by minorities? Those were some of the issues that come immediately to mind. With the company itself they didn't want to lose control. They focused on quality assurance. They focused on what precedents might be set and, particularly, keeping in mind that there was another negotiation going on at the same time, there was some question of not making commitments that they would not be able to keep over the long term. This is one of my favorite examples of how the whole relationship between parties changes over the course of the mediation process, so that mediated agreement isjust a small part of the change. I think that one of the most important outcomes of a successful mediation isn't so much the agreement, but the changed relationship which makes that agreement possible. These negotiations took close to a year, and the closer we got toward the actual agreement, the more the minority community was willing to accept terms like "the company will attempt to," as opposed to "the company promises that." The company had been able to persuade them that they were serious in terms of keeping their promises. The community group got to the point where the company could say, "Look, we're going to make every effort and here is the effort that we will make," and the community organization or minority coalition accepted that because they had reached a trust level at that point that certainly had not been there at the beginning.

Question:
Was that done strictly by dialogue, or was there actual implementation along the way?

Answer:
No there was not. There was no implementation that I recall. There might have been, but it was mostly dialogue. The company provided a lot of generated credibility. They explained the operation and showed the fiscal report and so on. So if they said, "No, we can't do this," they gave reasons why. They were then willing to say, "...but we'll make these efforts to reach that point." Eventually they set down a rule that was accepted, and it was a good faith effort.

Question:
How instrumental were you as a CRS worker in developing those interests and directing both sides to maybe show the data or show that good faith was there?

Answer:
Of course I want to say it wouldn't have happened without us. I think we were instrumental. I think that some people see facilitators as just sort of being there and making it happen. After a while, I think you almost unconsciously help frame it in terms of making sure that both sides see what the significance is. You make sure that both sides take out the significance of the information that they were getting from the other side and understand why that information was being presented. I think that's what is often missed. Frequently, you have two parties in a conflict and there's been a lot of talk and a lot of alleged communication, but just because people are talking, doesn't mean that they're communicating. So part of the role that we, as mediators, play, is making sure that if people are talking, that the other side is listening and understanding. In a setting like this, I think that was as crucial as any case that we've worked in.

Question:
At any time during this case did any of the parties involved ask you to do something that you were unable to do?

Answer:
Not that I remember. I don't remember that.

Question:
Did you have to help the minority communities frame their issues or did they have it pretty well in mind?

Answer:
No they had it pretty well in mind.

Question:
Did they change over time?

Answer:
Not the basic issues. What it would look like in terms of an agreement and how it might be addressed, that's what the whole mediation process was about. I think what they wanted was pretty consistent all the way through.

Question:
Did that help shape what your ultimate goals were toward the mediation process? You were able to hear what their various interests were, did that help shape what your goals were?

Answer:
Oh, I don't have any goals. That's a trick question isn't it? I am only being partly facetious in this. Seriously I think our goal is to help those parties reach agreement, and more importantly, to create or form a relationship which is going to continue beyond the agreement. I can honestly say that we didn't have our own goals of what we were hoping one side or the other would do. I think almost inevitably in a mediation case, and I am not talking about this one, but in a more long, drawn out mediation, I find myself fluctuating between this side being so reasonable and that side being so obstinate and then that changes. So on any given day, I might have favored "one side" and wished that the other side saw that. But that changes, it doesn't remain consistent through the mediation process. To me, that's just a verification of the fact that I don't have a specific agenda of what I want the agreement to look like. I might have some ideas of what might work, but even if I do, I am very, very careful to inject that in a way nobody will be too influenced. When the agreement is signed, it is very, very important for them to see that it's their agreement. I don't mind them thinking that Hanson helped them reach that agreement, but it's got to be their agreement.

Question:
Did you see your role changing during this particular case? You mentioned being a facilitator?

Answer:
Not really. When we were doing some of the telephonic things, a major role ended up being a scribe. But of course, what we would do is focus on a particular aspect of the negotiations and then put together suggested language based on what we think we heard. Then we'd send that out to everybody and get the input and revise it and so on. But I think it's all part of that mediation process. There are about 30 or 40 different roles mediators play, and to some extent, I suspect we probably played them all at one time or another. Sometimes we were the scapegoat, sometimes the reality tester. But it was fairly consistently sort of a mediator/facilitator role throughout this case.

Question:
How did you decide when to bring the parties together?

Answer:
Usually, as a result of the telephonic shuttle diplomacy we had made significant progress in a certain area and were ready to go on to another part. I would summarize and confirm that everybody was seeing the same thing at the same time in the same room, confirming what we have accomplished. Then I would lay the ground work for where are we going next, and begin the process of deciding how we approach that. We probably met face to face every month or so and frequently we set a tentative date for when they might be able to do it again. Because this is not a group you could get together on a week's notice.

Question:
So you're doing a whole bunch of telephone work in between?

Answer:
Yes.

Question:
Did the conflict ever change over the duration of this case?

Answer:
Not really, I think the issues were made pretty consistent.

Question:
Was there ever a point during this case where you felt the minority community may not receive the fairest deal or get the most out of the resolution?

Answer:
I see that, but again it's always who decides what's fair. We can have a couple of mediators get together for beers at the bar and discuss, " is it my job to create a fair agreement or is it my job to reach the best agreement?"

Question:
Talk to us about that difference. Is that something that a mediator thinks about?

Answer:
I think it is. A mediator runs into danger as an impartial mediator if she begins to get an image of what would be fair. I would rather have the parties describe at the beginning what they would consider fair. Then they need to look at how they present that. Then the mediator must make sure that both parties have an understanding of what the other side would consider fair. I can think of one mediation in particular, not this one, which was probably a very good example of this. These two parties hated each other. There was no trust there at all. You could not discuss the issues at all until you could get some of that hostility out of the way. So one of the things that we did is to start off in very general terms talking about their hopes and priorities and expectations for the community. We would ask them what a fair agreement, in broad terms, would look like to them. As we discussed that, there was the beginning of seeing that there is some agreement here. We may have very different approaches, but there are some common denominators there. We didn't call it "fairness" at that time, but that's really what we were talking about. If we are talking about a fair system, that would include the principles that everyone agrees to. But I really do think that a mediator is going to get into trouble if they try to control whether or not an agreement is fair. On the other hand, I do think that a mediator has some responsibility to not allow a party to negotiate away basic civil rights.

Question:
Did that ever happen?

Answer:
No. The closest thing to that was in a case that never actually made it to mediation. In this case, there was competition among a number of vendors serving the same clientele and some had arrived there fairly recently and the others were more old-timers. So these newcomers, as interlopers, were cutting their prices to undermine the other companies' business and they were lowering their standards and providing a poor product. As a result of that, their appearance was detrimental to all of them. So one of the things that they wanted to talk about is how to not undercut each other by having a similar price structure. When I discussed that with the antitrust division, the man at the other end of the phone was absolutely appopletic. The poor man could hardly talk. I would say, "Calm down. We haven't done this yet." He was totally hysterical because he had visions of having to go and drag parties into court who would then produce a mediation agreement signed by the Department of Justice Community Relations Service. So he was not a happy camper. I tried so hard to calm him down, but he was absolutely hysterical. The bottom line is, we could not make that one of the issues to be negotiated. The parties, even though they had agreed to other issues to be discussed as well, like quality of service, appearance, and training, they were not interested in negotiating any of these other points unless they could also talk about the pricing. So we never entered formal mediation or even informal mediation. We had some meetings with the group to explore whether or not to use mediation, but we never actually entered mediation. I think there was a good result though, and this isn't the only time this has happened. There are times when we get involved and begin to do an assessment to see whether or not we can do mediation in a very heated, potentially violent, situation. Sometimes just our involvement has enough of a calming influence that tempers cool off and the whole thing de-escalates. So even though we didn't help them reach a mediated agreement, it diffused enough so that other forces could then enter into the process and it didn't become violent. In this particular situation, there had been many physical confrontations and it really did look like it might result in serious violence among competitors. But it never reached that level of tension again. The very fact that we did, in fact, have them talking to each other to some extent, they began to hear each other's specific needs and concerns in greater detail than they did when they were trying to push each other out of the way. So we helped to defuse the actual tension that had existed. This was a successful CRS case, even though it certainly wasn't a successful mediation case. I do think that our involvement at that particular time did play a positive role in diffusing that situation.

Question:
When you're going into a situation that you think is potentially violent, do you approach it differently than others?

Answer:
Very carefully. I don't know what you mean by differently. It depends on the kinds of violence that you're talking about.

Question:
I don't know give me some examples.

Answer:
Ok, very recently, we were in this case where we worked together with the Kansas City Regional Office. We're in Pine Ridge and AIM and Pine Ridge Leadership wanted to march into White Plains to protest. There had been a couple of recent murders which had been unsolved. There were allegations of mistreatment of Indians in the town and that the town was using the sale of alcohol to the detriment of the Native American community. There had been a march the week before which had gone peacefully, but as the marchers got ready to return to the Pine Ridge reservation, others stayed behind. There was some burning and looting and destruction, so when plans were made for another march, there was a real concern that this might become violent. It was at that point that CRS got involved. So there was a potential for violence there. One of the key things that we try to do before an event which might lead to violence is that we get the key players, the leaders, together to talk about what expectations each one has about the coming event. We talk about what parameters each one has set, what are their absolutes, and what is negotiable, so that each side would know what to expect of the other. In this case, we arranged for a meeting between the march leadership and the Nebraska Law Enforcement, particularly the State Patrol. We tried to come up with an understanding of how far marchers would be able to go. The Nebraska Law Enforcement understood that there was no intent to create any violence or to destroy any property. They understood, in fact, that the marchers would be training self-marshals. CRS helped, to some extent, in doing that too. AIM has a very effective security staff themselves, so they served as marshals to some extent in controlling their own group. When we actually got to the border and the point at which Nebraska Law Enforcement said, "This is as far as you can go," there were a number of demonstrators who wanted to contest that restriction. They wanted to cross that boundary and be arrested, and some did just that. Other leaders worked very, very hard to draw attention off those marchers, away from that confrontational setting, to avoid actual physical violence. There were police lined up shoulder to shoulder in riot gear and it was like 95, 97 degrees outside. It's not where I would have wanted to be at that particular day! Yet the marchers said they were not leaving until those arrested were returned. CRS tried, but was unable to negotiate an agreement whereby those arrested were released on their own recognizance because these marchers really wanted a court test of their first amendment rights, of where they could go and what they could say there. On the other hand, nobody really wanted violence. Eventually they were released, but they were not returned to the border, where there was still some tension, but they were transported back to Pine Ridge, away from the confrontation site, and released there. We had a debriefing with the law enforcement and march leaders later that day or the next day, and all of them were convinced that, had it not been for the meeting prior to the march, and the understanding that had been reached there the trust that had been built up. I remind you that they were not "best buddies," but there was a trust level established. Had that not been done, this probably would have ended up violently again . So I guess what I am saying, in probably way too many words, is that our primary response to a potentially violent situation is to try to get the key parties together beforehand to avoid that violence. Because once things have gotten out of control, it's difficult to use mediation skills to get it back on track. When you do this kind of preventive work. you can see where there might be actions that are exacerbating the violence, and try to deal with that. I know that the phrase, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" is sort of a cliche and trite, but that really is true. Usually even the people who might be involved in violence don't go out wanting violence. They might want to make a particular statement, and they might want to get arrested, but there are ways of doing that in a controlled manner which gives everyone what they want.

Question:
When you did this sort of thing, were you ever in any danger yourself?

Answer:
Yeah, in Boston, I was. And there's been some others too, where there were demonstrations that sort of went bad. But I am probably stupid, in a way I am not overly timid. But I know when to get out of the way. For instance I was in South Boston High School back in '74 , '75, when a white student was stabbed by a black student and all hell broke loose. It got to the point where white students formed bans marching through the school looking for "n*****s," as they called them, to attack. I don't mean to justify the initial stabbing, but you should understand that this happened after a long time during which black students had routinely been attacked. They had been harassed, they (the black students) always felt vulnerable, so this episode had a history. I am not defending the fact that one of the black kids had brought a knife and stabbed one of the white students, who was not killed, by the way, he survived. But all hell broke loose after the stabbing. Teachers were trying to get black students into classes and lock the doors to keep them safe. At one point I knew that there were like 3 or 4 black students behind me, and up came a group of about 15 white kids looking to see who they could beat up. Now I can't stop 15 white kids running down the hall, so I just tried to make myself as big and conspicuous and sort of in the way as I could not to stop them, but to at least give the kids behind me additional time to get out of the way. In fact when Columbine happened, and some of the students were talking about their experience inside the building I had an immediate flashback to the halls of South Boston High School. There were a lot of similarities in terms of the things being completely out of control and the panic and the fear and just being so irrational and feeling totally helpless as to what to do to avoid this. In South Boston, it ended up being an all day event, much like a military maneuver. In no time, word got around the entire community. You had, literally, thousands of white parents and neighbors in front of the building yelling to "get the black students" who were inside, even though that wasn't the terminology that they used . . .

Question:
Were they yelling at you?

Answer:
Not at me, specifically, at this point, as I was inside. Most of the white students were outside and eventually even the white staff were outside too. But they ended up getting all of the black students and staff into the auditorium which was inside without any windows because they were throwing things at the windows. Then the police came, including equestrian units, to try and move the crowds away, but they'd just come back. They'd move away, and then come back again from another direction.

Question:
So there were white parents actually trying to incite a riot?

Answer:
Oh absolutely, absolutely.

Question:
How long had CRS been on-site?

Answer:
We'd been there pretty much every day since school opening because it was such a potentially volatile situation.

Question:
What were you doing there while you were on-site?

Answer:
We were mostly looking for what was creating tensions in the building, looking at what kind of training we could do for staff in the school on such things as dealing with a diverse student body. Since integration had just started, they hadn't had to deal with diversity before, so they needed to do some contingency planning. They needed to consider what was the relationship between say, the school and the police. We also talked with staff and students about their concerns within the building regarding diversity issues. We tried to develop ways of responding to the concerns and resolving some of those problems that would diffuse tension and create a healthy educational setting.

Question:
How long had you been there when the stabbing took place?

Answer:
I am trying to think of when this actually happened. I had been there since school opened which would have been early September, and I think the stabbing was probably in November.

Question:
So all your work hasn't really had time to take effect yet.

Answer:
Right, in some ways that is true. But as a result of this incident, we helped create a community monitoring program in each of the schools. And we developed a tension assessment instrument and trained school staff in what to look for in schools to decide whether or not there were tensions brewing that might, in fact, result in violence. Plus we formed bi-racial parent councils. These were court-ordered. In Boston the schools really didn't do a whole lot, at this point, unless it was ordered by the court -- which made the court real popular! In South Boston I was the next best thing to the court. The presiding judge never went to South Boston High, but Silke Hansen, from the Department of Justice, was there everyday. So I was part of a "hit list." They literally had a hit list. The presiding judge was number 1; Silke Hanson was number 2. It got to where I would not go to South Boston at night at all. One reason that I was there most of the time is that CRS could not safely assign non-white staff there because they could not walk through South Boston without being assaulted or even killed. So it was very, very intense probably one of the ugliest situations that I've ever been involved in.

Question:
Were you ever able to do anything that successfully diffused the tension there?

Answer:
The biracial parent council we formed in South Boston did do that. That was one of the most remarkable groups of people that I have ever met. I remember the day we formed that group. The basic strategy of South Boston was, "Don't do anything that the court orders you to do." A lot of parents weren't even sending their kids to school because they were ordered to go. When the court ordered the formation of biracial parent councils, it was up to me to try to make this happen. We had a meeting, and the auditorium was packed with parents who wanted to make sure that no one would cooperate with this. So here I was, with my little briefcase, in front of an audience of a thousand, talking about the value of forming biracial parent councils. We did not have an election that night. Somehow I guess I had done enough talking and the right talking that it eventually worked. We asked people to please let me know if they would be willing to participate in something like that. And we got about half a dozen or so parents who contacted me afterwards. One of the them told me afterwards that he came because he knew that "the Justice Department" would be there, so he figured there wouldn't be any problems. When he realized that "the Justice Department" was this one lady walking in with a little briefcase, he was really upset. "What do they mean the Justice Department was going to be here what the hell is she gonna do?" he asked himself.

Question:
Are you being accurate with these numbers that there were a thousand parents there and out of them only 6 volunteered?

Answer:
Yeah, yeah.

Question:
Were you surprised with that six?

Answer:
I was delighted that there were six, yeah.

Question:
Three whites, and three blacks?

Answer:
No, these were all whites. These were all in South Boston and Roxbury, the other side of town. We didn't have any trouble getting enough black parents to participate. But most of them, at one time or another, faced harassment and threats from their own community for participating in this council--slashed tires, threatening phone calls, broken windows, that sort of thing. It just breaks your heart. Once I got a call at night and I still get emotional, just even thinking about some of those settings but I got a call from a woman who lived right across from school. She had agreed to be on the council even though she had opposed forced busing. She thought it was a terrible idea, but she wanted her children to get an education, and the only way to do that was to go to school. So she wanted to make it work. She called me around midnight. Her husband was diabetic and had lost at least both feet, so he was not very mobile, not in position to do a whole lot to protect himself or his family. There was a crowd outside of her house throwing rocks at her window and yelling horrible things basically threatening her for participating on the biracial council. She had called the police, but this was the South Boston precinct, so that did absolutely nothing. Her husband was feeling totally helpless because he wasn't in a position to do anything and so she called me. I don't remember what we did exactly, but I think we called central police headquarters and possibly the U.S. Marshal's office too somebody beyond South Boston, so that at least there would be somebody to go out to defuse that situation. Just sending your kids to school at all was taking a major stand and this was not an activist woman. This was just an older woman who had relatively young children for her age, who wanted them to get an education and wanted to do the right thing. And the hell that she went through because of that! At times like that, you really feel frustrated at not being able to do more. One of my favorite people on that council was a guy named Jim. Again, he wasn't really an activist, but he wasn't shy either. He had some involvement in his local church and he became one of the key leaders of that council. When Vice President Rockefeller sent somebody to Boston to get a feel for what was happening in the community, we wanted to make sure that he got some feedback from the white community that was trying to comply with the court order, not just from the "Louise Hicks" [uncooperative] types. So Jim invited them over to his house, and had a number of his white friends including all of those who were on the biracial parent council and he started to talk to them. The council had been in effect for a while now, and he explained that some of his newest, but best friends couldn't be there, because, he couldn't assure their safety if they came to his house. He explained that there were black parents who were serving on the council, but if they walked down the street they probably would get killed. He said, "You know, I've heard so much about violent blacks and rioting blacks, and how destructive they are, and how you can't trust them. Well, I'm going to tell you something," he said, "I remember watching the march in Washington and thousands of people standing in the rain quietly praying. If those had been a bunch of Irishmen who had been treated the way black people have been treated in this country," he said, "they would've taken that damn Washington Monument and wrapped it around the Capitol! So don't ever, ever come to me talking about violent blacks, because that's a mistaken notion and I'm not going put up with it!" I was really impressed. This was not the speech that Rockefeller's envoy had expected to hear in South Boston. But people like that are the ones who sort of make this job worth it. He became a real leader in that community. There came a point where we had police in the buildings.... Actually, I think they might have been there before the stabbing, as well, just because they knew in South Boston black students would not be safe, regardless. So they had to have protection for them. One of the first issues that the council addressed was that black students weren't going to feel much safer if all of the cops were white. They decided that, as a council, they needed to go to the police department and talk to the police chief about getting more diversity among the police at South Boston High. The group that went included two white parents, Jim and one other, and two black parents. They met with the chief. Jim was the one who took the lead on this, and the police chief was simply blown away when he had a white parent coming from South Boston to his office saying we need more black officers in that school. So these few parents had a huge impact. A great bonding took place among those black and white parents, as it became very clear very quickly that they all simply wanted their kids to be safe and they wanted their kids to get an education. That was such a strong common bond that there really was very little tension among them. There was apprehension, because neither knew exactly what to expect from the other, but they got very close very quickly as they began to realize that they were all just parents wanting the best for their kids.

Question:
What's the approximate time frame from when you first began this case to developing these biracial committees?

Answer:
Probably 3 or 4 months. School opened in September of 1974 and the court order came in June. But before school opened we did a lot of work with community leaders, including clergy, with the school system, and police department, trying to do some contingency planning. We assumed that there would be demonstrations, but we wanted them to remain peaceful. So we planned what these groups would do in case of an emergency. Who was going to be the liaison between school and police for instance? We also started looking for ways to form multiracial student councils so that, as these new groups of students were brought together, that they would have a mechanism for being able to work together. Unfortunately, in South Boston, that was next to impossible, because white kids and certainly their parents were very clear that they didn't want to do anything to try to make this successful. I was in front of school the first day that school opened in 1974. I really hadn't been personally actively involved in civil rights movement, per se. I was on the Poor People's Campaign in Washington a number of times and I had seen Selma, Alabama. I had also been in Memphis right after Dr. King was killed, and in part of the march there. So I knew there weren't too many friendly looks there, but it's one thing to see something like that on television even when the police used fire hoses and all of those atrocities -- but to be right in the middle of a group that exudes that kind of sheer hatred. I mean you can feel it and see it. What it does to people's appearance is amazing. People literally all look ugly-- and not because that's what they were naturally, but just looking into those eyes and seeing that hate... Then when the students got there, I said to myself, "God, I thought high school students were bigger than this." They just looked so small and vulnerable. And then there were these adults, mostly women, who were yelling obscenities at them, and they started throwing things in just sheer hatred of these kids I will never forget that.

Question:
Did this happen right when you started at CRS?

Answer:
Yeah. I had started with CRS in March of '72 and then in '73 CRS underwent a major riff. Before '73 we had close to 400 people and then in '73 we went down to just a little bit over a 100. So all of our field offices were closed, there had been about 40 of them, at least one in most of the major urban centers. But we had to shut those down and go down to only 6 regional offices instead of 10. But Boston and Denver, which had been field offices before became regional offices to coincide with the traditional federal regions. The only reason that I survived that riff, being the new kid on the block in New York, relatively speaking, was that I was willing to take a transfer to Boston. But I'd been with CRS just long enough by then to know that if I could keep a job with CRS, even if it meant moving to Boston, I would love to do that. One of the first things that we dealt with when I came to Boston, about a year before desegregation, was when was when somebody was doused with gasoline and set aflame over in Cambridge. I really came in at the end of that. So that was sort of a quick introduction to just to the overall climate in Boston. When I got up there in fall of '73, we already knew the desegregation case was there was in court, and that the decision would probably come within that year. The decision came in on June 21st and so from then on, for about 2 years, desegregation was almost the only thing that I had worked on. It was definitely my first major case.

Question:
Did the parent councils gain any more people over time?

Answer:
That was supposed to be the approximate size, but they eventually got a little bit more support. As we got monitors in the buildings, things got a bit better. Also, all of the schools hired some community aides--again trying to hire people from both sending and receiving communities -- to help provide a community presence within the building. One of the aides in South Boston was the older sister of the student who had been stabbed . But she was really supportive of efforts to improve relations in that building. She also was in support of that parent council and tried to help identify positive student leaders in the community who would help work towards improved relationships. So there were some interesting dynamics going on. We also set up a volunteer monitoring program, but getting volunteers was hard. The League of Women Voters sent some, so did the churches. We had to be careful, so that we wouldn't inadvertently recruit people who'd go in and become instigators. We also made sure that the instrument which we developed was one which called for very few judgements. Basically we told the monitors just to describe what was happening so that somebody else could make the judgement from that. We've used that same concept since then, in fact, in other situations where we've needed monitors or neutral observers. I've done quite a bit of training in that area. The issue is how do you do that in a way that everybody who sees the same thing would describe it the same way. For example, if two people saw a policeman arresting someone, one might say the police officer was confrontational, while another would say he was just being professional. So we get people to be very specific. Tell what the police officer did: he spoke in a very loud voice; he put his hands on the person; he made threats; we trained people to be very descriptive, rather than making judgements.

Question:
Did you ever turn down offers of assistance or outside resources?

Answer:
People who wanted to volunteer? I am trying to remember whether we did or not. I seem to remember that there were some who decided on their own that they couldn't do this because it was too emotional for them or because they felt too strongly. They didn't think they could be neutral if they saw something happening, they felt very strongly that they had to intervene and deal with it, rather than just be observers. I don't recall that we actually turned down volunteers but it might have happened.

Question:
Besides monitoring what did you do to try diminish tension after this incident?

Answer:
From there on, a lot of our focus was on working with, supporting, and providing some training to those biracial councils, not just in South Boston, but in other schools as well. South Boston was my major assignment, partly because I was the white on staff, but in many ways, South Boston kind of became the standard against which to measure what we were doing in other schools as well. We also continued working with police, and tried to get our local organizations to participate as monitors, in an effort to get them involved in a positive way, even if they weren't interested in being advocates or anything.

Question:
How did you do that?

Answer:
We just asked. I think everybody agreed that nobody wanted violence, so if this was an effort to stop violence from occurring, then people were willing to participate in that.

Question:
Sticking with this the desegregation case, I want to talk about the issue of trust. It seems like trust is very, very important in this particular case. How were you able to build it and sustain the trust of the parties that were involved?

Answer:
I think part of it is that I tried to show some experience, some expertise that might be useful. I made it clear that it was their choice about whether or not to trust me, and at the same time I tried hard not to over-commit or over-promise what I could do. Over a period of time, we just got to know each other. With some of those white parents on the biracial council, it was just the fact that I was there every day. And they knew that they could call me at midnight if they needed to. That created a certain sense of trust . For many of them, I was practically the only "outside" contact they had -- "outside" in terms of being someone they knew who was intimately involved in the internal operation of the process. The other thing that I ended up finding was a key tool in generating trust with somebody like school officials, and even police, is that I tried to be at the court hearings and I took notes and made sure that I got copies of things like court orders , or anything that was issued in writing. I was amazed at how often that information or those documents never got to the local school building. So that in many cases, I was one of the primary sources of accurate information--I was sort of a one person rumor control system. I knew what the accurate information was, when no one else did. So that, I think, did a lot to help gain me some credibility and trust. But again, it's a gradual process. At first I was maybe tolerated at best. After a while I would try to find people to talk to and see whether I could have some input with, and then eventually people actually approached me for assistance, including the principal. It was a gradual process.

Question:
Do you think you were able to work effectively when the trust levels were on the lower end?

Answer:
Probably not. The white community in South Boston was so distrustful of this entire process that I sort of epitomized the court order, so they didn't trust me at all. Even the people who eventually served on that biracial parent council were there because they supported complaints about the court order. But they wanted their children to get an effective education, and they wanted to avoid violence. None of them, initially, was a strong supporter of desegregation in Boston. To some extent what was happening in South Boston just confirmed that this was a terrible idea, because who needs this? But some, like Jim in particular, reached the point of saying that this was long overdue. He felt they had to do that because they couldn't continue living with the attitudes that existed in that community. But none of them were strong pro-desegregation activists, and Lord knows, they were very cautious about what role if any they would play in this process, and whom to trust.

Question:
Did you ever feel that your race or gender was a factor in your gaining trust with the parties?

Answer:
Here in Boston in particular or in general?

Question:
Well, Boston first . . .

Answer:
If I had not been white I couldn't have gone there everyday, just for safety reasons, so it would've been difficult. Now we had black staff and a Hispanic person who could sort of get away with going out there, but I did it more. We didn't have any permanent Hispanic staff in the regional office at that particular point. If the black staff knew exactly where they were going, and how to get there, and they didn't get out of the car until they were in the parking lot, well in the school they were safe, but otherwise they were not. We had one conciliator who came up from the Atlanta office who got lost and got in trouble. He just managed to get back in his car and almost threatened to run some people over to get out of there, but he was feeling very unsafe, trying to figure out where to go and how to get there safely. So if we had staff from out of the region, there was no way we could safely send them into that part of the community. It got to the point where I felt much safer in the black neighborhoods than I did in South Boston, because there were folks in South Boston who knew me and who weren't crazy about me. During the day it was pretty much safe, but I didn't want to walk dark streets at night alone in South Boston.

Question:
What about the gender issues? You mentioned Jim coming in and being so effective. I am wondering if he was able to get across the message more effectively because he was male versus being a female?

Answer:
Well first of all, the message he was bringing across was supposed to come from a parent council and I wasn't part of the parent council, and so I wasn't even at that meeting. I just heard about it from police afterwards and how astounded they were. There is no question that he was probably the strongest participant from the white community. At the same time, the strongest leader from the black community was a woman. Sarah was her name, and she had been involved in civil rights in North Carolina, I believe. Early on, as we were sort of getting to know each other, she talked about some of her experiences there. One of the concerns that this council had was that, "There are so few of us, what can we really do?" and she was saying, "You know, Jesus Christ only had 12 disciples and look what he did! We've got 12 people here so we can do a whole lot in this place!" And so, she was great and she sort of became the mentor. Jim was a strong leader because he believed this situation wasn't right, but she was the one who had the experience. She was the one who could talk about her own history in this kind of a situation. So people looked to her for sort of some of the moral leadership in this. They made a remarkable team.

Question:
Did you facilitate the parent council?

Answer:
Yes, to some extent. Certainly, I did, during those first meetings and I brought them together in the first place.

Question:
Did you help to set their agendas?

Answer:
Yes.

Question:
Did they do any formal negotiating?

Answer:
Not really. They did negotiate with the police department to send more black officers and they did it very effectively. The next day there was a remarkable change in the complexion of the officers at South Boston High. They had a profound impact, since everybody knew that South Boston whites opposed forced bussing and that the entire community felt that way. So when the police chief found someone this forceful and this adamant working together with black parents and coming jointly as a team to say this is what we need in South Boston, oh yeah that made an impact, it definitely did! Q - Tell me a little more about the dynamics on the bi-racial parent council. How did the black and white parents learn to trust each other?

Answer:
I just got them talking about their hopes and fears and they found out how much they had in common. Of course the black parents focused more on the security issue and the fear that they had for the safety of their children, but that had a profound impact on the white parents because they realized it was their neighbors that were generating that fear. I don't know if "guilt" is the right word, but the white parents certainly could identify with the black parents' fears. So at least within that setting they wanted to be a resource to turn to, so those parents did not have to be afraid. And they wanted to show that even though there was just a small group of them, that there were those in South Boston who did not want to see any children get hurt.

Question:
Was there ever any time of impasse in this whole process?

Answer:
Not that I recall. I think that part of it was, to some extent, that they were working in a crisis setting the whole time and the crisis of keeping that school safe was such a big issue that very little got in the way in trying to promote that.

Question:
When you said the whole time, how long are we talking about?

Answer:
A school year.

Question:
Were things better the next school year?

Answer:
They were slightly less volatile, anyway. Part of it was that by the next year there were some of the more reasonable white kids in there. In the first year, some of the potentially most violent white kids were the ones that were there because that was their job, almost, to make sure that this didn't work. They weren't there for an education; they simply wanted to prove that this bussing thing wasn't going to work, not in South Boston, anyway. That wasn't true of all of them, of course, but it was true of some of them.

Question:
Well what happened to those kids?

Answer:
Well, some of them were still there the next year, but there were more of the moderate kids, if you will, that began to come back. And I think as the reality set in, that this was not going to go away, more moderate white kids began to come back. Very few of the students actually supported desegregation or forced bussing, but they were not wanting to boycott any longer, at least. I'll never forget one day I don't remember whether it was in the first year or the second year, but there were a lot of white kids who had returned. And there was an assembly, because Up With People had come to town, trying to promote good will and understanding. So here they were at South Boston High School, on stage, and one of the first songs that they sang as soon as I heard it, I said to myself "Oh no!" was "What color is God's skin?" The white kids started yelling "white, white, white." It was a disaster. And so predictable. I could've told them that would happen, that they shouldn't sing that song in South Boston -- I mean I love the sentiment, but trust me it's not going to go over in South Boston. They had those kids beaming and dancing up on stage, and of course, they were mostly white -- they weren't putting a whole lot of focus on desegregating that group at that time, so it really was a disaster.

Question:
You mentioned earlier that you were a source of accurate information. Was there ever a time where there were factual disagreements? For example, one group saying one thing, and another, the opposite?

Answer:
I am sure there were, but I can't remember specific examples. Sometimes, there would be a court order and snippets of that would filter into the community, but it would be totally distorted. For example, even in the formation of those parent councils, it took a long time until the accurate information actually filtered into the school in terms of what was supposed to happen. There were rumors that there would be roomfuls of parents who were going to control the school, and this kind of thing. So I learned if there was a new court order, I always made extra copies and took them with me, so that I could at least give them to the principal and some of the key leadership so they would have accurate information on that.

Question:
So you waited until the parties came to you with the inaccurate information ?

Answer:
Sometimes I initiated it. For instance, I'd take something to Dr. Reed, the principal. That was one of my ways of getting trust with him because, initially, I don't think he was necessarily thrilled about a fed coming into his school. Dr. Reed was an interesting person. He was able to retire he had been in South Boston High forever -- parents of the kids who were in school remembered Dr. Reed as their principal. I mean he was an institution. He was one of the most highly-regarded and highly-respected people in that community and he could have retired before desegregation. But he stayed on, even though he was opposed to the desegregation plan and to force bussing, but he thought that his leadership there would be able to minimize the disruption and violence. I think that he was deeply hurt and scarred by the anger and the negative reaction and the hostility that was focused on him, because he was seen as a turncoat. So it was an incredibly difficult time for him. He wasn't necessarily looking to the federal government for his salvation; let me put it that way, so I had to build up his trust. If I had important information that I could share with him, or give to him, then I became a resource, which is how I wanted him to see me. So it went beyond just squelching rumors.

Question:
What brought this whole situation to an end? How did you extricate yourself from that?

Answer:
Well actually, what really happened was that I was transferred to Washington to help coordinate our desegregation efforts nationally.

Question:
Did the federal office take over for you?

Answer:
Just the local staff at CRS was still there. Things slowed down during the second year. During the first year, I don't remember working on anything other than Boston. We were working 12-14 hours a day -- it was unfortunate we weren't documenting comp time at the time I could still be out on vacation otherwise! But typically, I would be at the school before 7 o'clock in the morning, because school opening, when the buses got there, was always one of the tense times. Then I'd stay until mid-morning, and then go back to the office when we'd have our staff meeting and look at what we needed to do for the rest of the day. Then I'd either go to some of the other schools or to South Boston for the afternoon ,and there were inevitably evening meetings somewhere, community meetings, parent meetings, or church groups that wanted information on how to become involved and so on. And then I'd go home and get my phone calls there they were about this too--it was a very intense year. The second year, starting in Fall of '75 was the second phase. That's when Charleston desegregated. Charleston was sort of the seen as almost the sister school of South Boston in terms of being as anti-bussing, with strong Irish opposition. So there was the anticipation of the kind of violence and hostility that had occurred in South Boston. There were media there from all over the world. But Charleston actually went fairly peacefully. There were some minor skirmishes, but but it was nothing even close to what had happened in South Boston the year before. And there were all of that media there looking for it. I had to laugh because you ended up reading more articles about media covering the amount of media covering the event than you did about the event itself. There were literally reporters interviewing each other and then covering who was there. All of Bunker Hill was covered with reporters and TV cameras and everything else and when there wasn't much happening in the school they started panning across the field and taking pictures of other cameras. It was amazing, but clearly there had been some lessons learned during that first year. South Boston had toned down somewhat and the multiracial parent councils were sort of the norm for most of the schools. So in year two, we actually started working on some cases outside of Boston. We started going up to Maine, for example. There are a number of reservations up there and we had some cases near there, and there were other school cases, but not necessarily desegregation cases, in Connecticut and so on. Since I was the only education specialist, or person who'd been originally hired as an education specialist, who was still left, I would be used as a resource around the country, even when though I was assigned to Boston. So I was doing some travel outside of the region already, once things toned down somewhat within Boston Once I moved to Washington, I began working on other desegregation problems. Detroit and Milwaukee and Madison were desegregating, as was Louisville, Kentucky. And Boston was just finishing Boston. So I went back to Boston to see if they had done anything in terms of monitoring. Since so many cities were going through the same thing, it made to have some central coordination, at least in terms of resources. I ended up staying in Washington for three years to coordinate efforts in all those different cities. Even though I appreciated getting to all of these different places, and having all of those different experiences, I really missed seeing a case through from beginning to end. As a coordinator, I typically just went out as a resource to the local staff. I did a lot of training of local monitors and I did a lot with discipline policies. and In both Louisville, Kentucky and Detroit the courts asked us to do an analysis of how discipline policies in the school system served to either support or undermine desegregation within the system. In some places, discipline policies were being used to re-segregate the classrooms because minority students were being suspended at just incredible rates. So the judges asked us to look into that in those two cases and to make recommendations of what alternative disciplinary policies could be put into place to keep that from happening. I enjoyed doing that -- it was exciting, but I still missed actually working an entire case. Not because I didn't totally trust the people who were doing it-- we had wonderful people there-- but, you know, once I got my nose in somewhere, I had a hard time getting it out.

Question:
Did you consider the work you did at South Boston a success?

Answer:
Yes, a success to the extent that I think I made a positive difference. I mean the situation is such that there isn't any way one person could make all the difference. Boston was so complex in some ways. They never had just one basic racist situation. So I don't know what could have been done to make the entire desegregation process peaceful. But I do think that my being there and the things that I did there and the activities and efforts that I got involved in made a difference in some key areas. And to that extent yes, it was successful. If success means that the whole thing was non-violent and Boston no longer has a race problem-- no I didn't quite accomplish that.

Question:
Do you think CRS measures success the same way that you measure your success?

Answer:
I think we have to. I think we have a hard time sometimes, and we typically have difficulties in explaining to Congress what it is that we do and why it is so important. It's very difficult to measure violence that didn't occur. How do you document situations that could have become more confrontational, had you not been there? I think what we have learned to do is to focus very heavily on what we would call "the assessment process." That is assessing who, in fact, are the parties, what are the issues that are on the table or are at play here, who are some other parties who are on the periphery parties that might have an interest in this, or have other resources or skills that might be applicable. In light of all of that, CRS considers what it can do in a particular setting. Very often it isn't solving the big problem, but it's being able to deal with a little piece here and there. If we can deal with that little piece, we would consider that having been successful, even though it might still be in a broader sense, a very tense and very conflicted situation. Right now we've got two CRS people in this region, for instance. Even if we concentrated all of our resources on just one case, we wouldn't be able to resolve that enough that there wouldn't be any more racial problems there forever and ever and ever, but we can identify an immediate peace . If we can make a difference for that time, we would consider that a success.

Question:
You talked about the presence of the media. How did you typically deal with the media? Did you see it as a help or hindrance to your process?

Answer:
Oh heavens! Are we talking very specifically or are we talking in general?

Question:
In general, for a start.

Answer:
If I'm mediating, I absolutely avoid having the media there. So far I think there's only one exception to that statement. I generally do not allow media into the mediation. I make sure that I explain to them beforehand why, and try to explain that if media's in the room, we end up having two levels of negotiation. We have one level of negotiation which was sort of typical mediation, trying to resolve a problem. But we've got another level where they're talking strictly to the media wanting to make sure that they say what needs to be in the paper in the morning. That is not necessarily conducive to actually solving a problem. I have generally found media to be very understanding of that and accepting of that. If it's a formal type of mediation process, I try to tell them that when the mediation is completed we will be sure they get a copy of the signed agreement. We will have a press conference where they can talk to the parties that were involved, if they want to do that. But we ask them please understand that at the time negotiations are going on-- within that setting-- it just would undermine the process. They've usually been pretty understanding of that.

Question:
You mentioned Rodney King in L. A?

Answer:
I ended up spending about 5 months in Los Angeles after the Rodney King event and as part of that lump of things. I was involved in arranging for, and then actually conducting mediation between a group of Korean businessmen and the federal, state, and private agencies and organizations that were in Los Angeles for disaster response. That included FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Administration), the California version of FEMA, the Red Cross, Administration and others. A lot of that ended up being almost like a cultural training, because a big part of the concern of the Korean business people was that they weren't familiar with American culture. For instance they didn't have a clue as to what to do with the dry beans they were being given for food assistance. If they were going to be getting food assistance, they needed things they were familiar with. So we got the Red Cross to look for more fresh vegetables and rice. In some cases it was just a matter of looking at the physical layout of the disaster relief center it was called the DAC Disaster Application Center. I looked at the layout and considered how that lead to or avoided confrontations between inpatient people who needed help. Sometimes we ended up just playing a role in rearranging the furniture in a way that made it more conducive to having people being served at various sides at the same time, rather than having long lines which made people lose patience. There was a real sense all along on the part of the Korean victim community that they were not being understood, that the severity of their situation wasn't being dually acknowledged and they could not understand why nobody was taking responsibility for the fact that they, through no fault of their own, had suffered all of these losses. They couldn't figure out why nobody had resigned yet -- you know, out of shame, for having allowed this to happen. And the other piece which was major, particularly early on, was that they did not believe that they were receiving protection from the police or national guard for their businesses. So they ended up forming their own protection force a young adult team which was heavily armed and spent nights patrolling streets of Korean businesses to make sure that they weren't vandalized, attacked, or destroyed. As they began to go through the process of applying for assistance at the DAC, and then waiting for a response, and looking for help, there was a lot of impatience. Language was a big problem. They were threatening big demonstrations in front of the DAC at first, and later on they did have demonstrations at City Hall. It took awhile to get mediation going. When we were trying to arrange it, there were one or two Koreans who wanted to speak for everyone. We tried to explain that while it wasn't that we didn't trust them, and we were sure they were honorable people, we couldn't take their word for what the entire Korean community wants. We insisted that we have more participation from the Koreans. There were a couple of business associations we got to participate and we had the leader of this Korean young adult team which was doing the protecting service. There were a couple who were clearly sort of elders within the Korean community, too. The entire process had to be bilingual, so I had to have a translator, because I don't speak any Korean at all. These were all day sessions, and we ended up going on for three days. I could never persuade any translator to come back for a second time because they were so worn out, so totally exhausted after one day. So there was no way I could persuade them to come back again. Part of what happened is that some of the Korean victim party who spoke at least some English, so if the translator didn't get it just right, they would jump in and say "No," so this poor person had a very, very difficult time with it. The other challenging thing was that almost everybody at the table on both sides were men, and here I was, a woman, taking charge of the process. But I did it, and it was fascinating, just because of the dynamics of what was going on, some of the interactions among parties. Never mind the actual negotiations between the parties. I ended up becoming very close to that leader of that adult group. He calls me "Mom." I'm his American mother. So we ended up being a very close link into that particular community. They really they were concerned that they receive protection. They would've much preferred that L.A. police do it, so later on, we managed to arrange for some meetings between some of them and law enforcement on how to coordinate security services in these neighborhoods It didn't become a full time vigilante group working in the community, but it was certainly challenging.

Question:
Did you provide technical assistance to both sides?

Answer:
Yes. I always provide technical assistance to both sides. Now sometimes, the technical assistance required by an establishment side, just for the purpose of kind of grouping them, they require less assistance than the minority community. But I make sure that I offer pre-mediation training and preparation to everybody who's going to be involved. In this case, there was actually relatively little preparation for each. Partly because of the immediacy. I think some people thought they were just coming to a meeting. But I made sure that we kind of put it into a mediation session rather than a free-for-all conversation, because it was the only way to accomplish what we needed to and, well, I'm a mediator, and that's what I do. But I really thought in this particular setting -- we must have had at least thirty people in the room that we needed mediation. We had many response agencies maybe about twenty people, and six, maybe eight Korean representatives. So we had to have some kind of a structured process so this discussion could actually take place. Part of what came out of that is that, after all the broad issues were addressed, was there were then sort of splinter mediations, if you will, or splinter meetings. And the one that comes particularly to mind was with the Small Business Administration. Besides FEMA, SBA ended up being one of the major sources for financial assistance. They had an excellent director there on-site who really bent over backwards to understand and meet the needs and be flexible. He was one of the least bureaucratic bureaucrats. So that made a big difference. They helped out with business loans, because it was mostly businesses that were destroyed during that time. We helped facilitate the Koreans applications, helping them to apply by giving them technical assistance to make the application process easier.

Question:
So the negotiations were basically over what kind of assistance was going to be provided and how and when?

Answer:
Yes. And what the procedures would be for making that happen. A lot of it was even just how you get access to some of the leadership of some of those agencies if you know there's a particular issue in your community that isn't being responded to. And in some cases, the time line was a problem, because when people apply for a loan they'll get an answer within a month. But these folks were looking for an answer next week. So how do you handle some of those emergency situations? In some cases, it was just a matter of really clarifying what the procedures are and what has to be done to have to go through that.

Question:
Can these many mediations be seen as a way to reduce some of the power disparity that exists in between the groups? You mentioned that the city was represented by maybe twenty...

Answer:
Yeah. But it wasn't the city, what you really had was about five or six different parties of maybe two people each. I know that math doesn't add up. But it wasn't that one party that had twenty representatives and another party that had six representatives. Instead, you had, well as I said, SBA might have somebody, FEMA might have two or three people there, the California Emergency Organization might have two people there. Red Cross had a couple women there, so I wasn't the only woman in the room. And so, even though they were all sort of the white establishment, if you will, they were not one party. They were different entities. And so for those three days, all of them were there.

Question:
Was there any problem with coordination between the agencies or internal conflicts between the agencies about who was doing what?

Answer:
There probably were, but I can't give you specific examples right now. One situation that I do remember was a misunderstanding between one of the members of the Korean protection team and one of the white agency people. One of the Korean protection team came into the mediation late. He'd been out on patrol during the night and came in and sat down in the Korean group. I sat closer to the back so maybe five, six, seven people down, closer to where the rest of the establishment group was sitting. But he came in, he was exhausted, and he began to play with something he had in his pocket. Turns out it was an ammunition clip. And he kind of put it on the table and started fidgeting with something else and later on, and I kind of noticed it, but it didn't look terribly disruptive, and so I continued with the process. Then later on one of the White parties described that as an example of an open threat by the Koreans of how they saw this because he was clearly demonstrating his ammunition and what would happen to them if they didn't give the Koreans what they wanted. I was shocked, because it did not look at all that way to me. I've seen threatening gestures and it's not that I don't recognize them. If anything, this kid was nervous, because most of it was being done was in English. Even though you had the translation, this was probably more White people than he'd probably ever encountered in one setting before. So he was just trying to figure out what to do with himself while he was in this very formal setting with a lot of people that he didn't know. But people see what they expect to see. And clearly there had been information, word had gotten out about this young adult team out there acting as a vigilante group, protecting Korean businesses, and some folks were very apprehensive about that. And I'm not saying that was totally unfounded. I don't happen to think that vigilant groups are a good idea under any circumstances, including here. But then all he had to see was this Korean with this munition clip and he just thought it was a threat. Of course, he probably came in threatened. So this was just conformation to him on how threatening and hostile this group was. It was really interesting.

Question:
Was this a power issue? Did the different perceptions occur because of differing power levels, and if so, what did you do to try to level the playing field?

Answer:
I think power and balance is more than just numbers. And certainly to some extent, just having that translator there was a way to level the playing field. And again, it wasn't just to make sure that everybody understood, but it was also a visible part of putting everybody on an equal level. So it had symbolic value as well as helping with communication. So the symbolism and I'm just saying it was just a gesture, but the gesture itself, aside from the value in communicating and so on, of making sure that nobody has the advantage because of language.

Question:
Was that your recommendation?

Answer:
Oh yes! I wouldn't have done that without a translator. There were perhaps some in the group who could have negotiated even if it had been all English, but the majority of that group would have been at a distinct disadvantage and they would have felt disempowered. So there's no way that you could have done that particular mediation without the translator there. Actually we didn't use caucuses that much, and in some ways I'm surprised because usually this is the kind of setting where I would have expected to use a lot of caucusing. But I prepared everyone ahead of time, so they knew what to expect and weren't just shooting from the hip. That doesn't mean that other issues didn't come up, but at least there was some sense of preparation. So I think that serves to help empower. And I tried very early on in the mediation process to make it clear that I am, in fact, controlling the process. If there's a specific question, I make sure that that's addressed and that's responded to. I make sure that if there is a point that's made that everybody understands it. If I think that somebody might have missed it, make sure that it's either repeated or that the party itself repeats it. Sometimes I will ask questions, not so much because I don't know, but because I think it's important for everyone to hear what the answer is. So I'll do ask. I'm very good at saying, "Call me stupid, but..." Sometimes you can see that one side or the other is puzzled, but you can also see that they don't want to ask. So I'll play dumb at that point and ask the questions that I think they want to ask but won't. I have no problem being the person who needs the information because I just don't understand. So I think all of those help in that particular setting.

Question:
Now you mentioned something a couple of times that's interesting to me. We talked about the idea of neutrality and impartiality. How does that affect specific relationships?

Answer:
That [relationship with my Korean "son"] was after the mediation, by the way.

Question:
I was just wondering how you were able to develop that relationship and still be neutral or impartial?

Answer:
First of all, that relationship was not there during the mediation process. In fact, it really started off almost like a joke. And one of the subsequent meetings with SBA, I was in New York and he was there too. And his English was not terrific. He speaks it well enough to be able to get along, but it's a halting English and it's one of those where you sort of have to get used to hearing it to be able to understand it. And then somewhere along the line, as we were talking about Los Angeles and what we hoped to do here in the SBA meeting today, he asked me "Well, how old are you?" And I said, "Why? How old are you?" And he was twenty something. I said, "Oh shoot. I'm old enough to be your mother." So he said, "Okay mom." And that's how that started and it just sort of stuck. And then I heard someone say, "Oh, there comes your son." I said, "My son?" And so it was sort of an evolving relationship if you will. Now we ended up becoming closer friends, but I think even there it was more a matter that I had developed enough trust so that he felt comfortable coming to me and I could convince him, for instance, to negotiate with the police about security without his roaming the streets armed at night. And I guess I almost inevitably, it's not necessarily a relationship, but most cases I've been involved in, I've developed relationships with both sides. So for instance, if I was in someone's town, I'd probably call and say hi, so that it gets beyond being purely professional. I think part of that is just my personality.

Question:
Did those relationships ever put you in a position, unintentionally of course, in a situation where it's difficult....?

Answer:
Sometimes. One of the things which always became interesting within the Korean community was that there was a lot of competition within the community itself. It was like, everybody was the leader. So as an impartial third party working in this, an ongoing process was to make clear that, "I understand that you represent this group and we want to make sure that you are included and that you're a part of the process, but there are others who feel just as strongly that they have a valid or maybe even THE valid perspective. And so we need to make sure that everyone is included. Over a period of time they began to recognize that and appreciate that. When I was there the first time for those five months, from May until September of 1992, as that long detail was just about over and it was clear that I was going home, four different victim associations, who to some extent were sort of in competition before, came and visited me at my office and brought me plaque of appreciation. And it really became quite emotional. First of all I had not expected that. And I said, "I really feel like I didn't do a whole lot. There are still so many needs and so much more that needs to be done here. But they said, "Silke, at least you listened." I tell that story often, not because I want to show off the plaque, but it again was sort of a visible validation of the importance of just listening. There are times when I'd be there until late in the night or would come at almost any hour of the day or night just to listen. You spend a whole lot of time listening. You begin to realize how much of the conflict and how much of the frustration and then anger on the part of the victim communities come not so much from what's not being done, but a sense of, "They aren't even listening to me. They don't even take me seriously." And so listening is such a crucial part of what you do. Much earlier in our conversation I mentioned going into a community and almost being accosted with the anger and frustration and then hearing all of these stories. Then all of that gets toned down by the time you get to the tables. But I think the key to that also is that regardless of how angry and how almost belligerent they might be, I'm listening. And it's probably one of the few times that someone that they think might be able to do something came and actually listened to everything that they had to say. So that listening and hearing is such a crucial part.

Question:
How did you know when it was the right time to leave that situation?

Answer:
When Washington said my assignment was up. It was close to the end of the fiscal year, for an agency with the budget of CRS, it was a major investment even though FEMA supported a lot of the actual cost for that. But again for an agency the size of CRS, it was very costly. We were a little bit larger then. We had a little bit over a hundred people. Leo Cardenas was the regional director here. In essence, he lost his senior person for five months. So that's a long time.

Question:
Going back to the beginning now, tell us how you typically get involved in a case. Would you say that most of the cases come in here by people calling you and asking you for help, or do more come by you saying, "I think we ought to get involved," and going out proactively?

Answer:
You know, I'm not sure. I think now it's probably more from people calling and asking for help, or calling and notifying me of a situation. These people are often not even directly involved in the cases they report it's just that I've been around enough, and enough people know me, so I've made a lot of connections. That wasn't necessarily the case before, but it probably is now. Of course, there are still quite a few cases that we read about in the paper, or hear about on the news, and say, "We ought to alert that" (I'm sure I must have described the alert assessment process, or somebody from CRS must have.) So at any rate, we still get cases both ways.

Question:
How many alerts do you have per month, in comparison to how many cases you actually get involved in? Just rough numbers.

Answer:
A month? Well, for a year we get anywhere from 100 to 150. Actual cases well, that's probably closer to 25 or 30.

Question:
So how do you decide which ones to take on and which not?

Answer:
In some cases, after we have alerted them, we may decide that they're not even in our jurisdiction because they're individual-oriented cases rather than community cases. Also, if there is somebody else who is already dealing with the situation, since we have such limited resources, we might say, "Well, it looks like it is being handled." Sometimes, it's just a matter of not having enough resources and not being able to respond to everything. Those are the main criteria that I can think of. Sometimes we're alerted to a case, but by the time we get ready to work on it, it's already been resolved, or it's no longer the emergency or urgent situation it appeared at first to be. There are times when our getting involved would be essentially re-opening something that has already been resolved, so it wouldn't make sense. It would be one thing if we were looking for work. We could probably find it. But that not being the case, there are some that just take care of themselves. Or sometimes there are cases where the parties just say, "No thanks, Silke, we really don't need you for this one. I think we can handle this without your assistance." And that is fine. There are just some minority communities who would prefer to say, "We got them to do it," rather than, "We reached an agreement." And they don't want to have anybody else assisting them unless they think they might not get what they need.

Question:
Do you have any pattern you follow in terms of who you talk to first when you are trying to do an assessment of a case?

Answer:
Oh, I probably do without realizing it. If it's a request for assistance, I will generally talk to the person or group that made the request first, just to find out why they made the request and what is going on. So, if it is a police department that wants assistance or a school district that wants assistance in training or planning or something, I would talk to them first. If it's a complaint, an actual conflict between a minority community and an institution, I would probably go to the minority community first. In many cases the institution won't be available, or certainly won't acknowledge that there is an issue. So, there is no point in going there and trying to find out what the issues are, because they will tell me, "There are no issues." So I would go to the minority community first and find out what's going on, what their issues are, and what their perceptions are. Then I have that information when I go and talk to the institution or agency or the office with which the community has the dispute. Doing it the other way around just wouldn't get me any information.

Question:
How do you determine who exactly to talk to?

Answer:
If it's something that was just in the paper, and I don't know anybody there, I would start by trying to locate the organization and/or any names that were mentioned in the paper. I would try to find a way of contacting them and talking to them. If there are no organization names or specific individuals to start with, then I'd try to find out which minority organizations exist in the community in question. Then I would figure out whether I knew anyone in the community who might be able to get me connected to the actual "players". I still would prefer to start with the community perspective because that is where the conflict seems to exist and then move on to the institution. In each case, I would ask the people that I talk to, "Who else would I contact to get more information, to get a broader perspective on this?"

Question:
What kinds of questions do you ask?

Answer:
Well, after I say, "I am from the Federal Government, and I am here to help you," which is actually funny, especially with larger meetings..... I do that and I know people are going to laugh! But it also helps to ease tensions a little bit, and loosen people up. I can remember one meeting that I went to where there was a lot of tension regarding law enforcement in a predominantly Hispanic community. Once I got there, it was clear that at least some of the community wasn't thrilled about having the Justice Department there either. It just so happened that this mass community meeting was on April 15. So the introduction was something like, "Okay, so this is your tax dollars at work: Silke Hansen is here from the Federal Government to help you!" I intentionally used that line to say, "I know what you are thinking, so just let me see how I can be helpful." I think the fact that I made fun of myself a little bit didn't come across as too "officious," if you will, but rather acknowledged some of their misgivings and doubts helped cut through at least some of the tension. I was still challenged, of course it was not a piece of cake. But after the meeting, people said, "Well, it's a good thing we've got a real facilitator for this meeting." I think being able to use some humor and, I find, particularly self-deprecating humor helps. I don't like to imply that I have all the answers. Sooner or later, they're going to realize that I don't have all the answers anyway, so why pretend in the first place? Now, with individuals or small groups, I start by asking them, "What's going on? What is happening here?" Usually, even though I explain the role of CRS and the fact that we are impartial third parties that we are there as mediators and that we work with both sides people will try to "bring us over to their side." Maybe that's just human nature. They will come up with proof and documentation and offer to get more documentation. So it always becomes a balancing act. On one hand, I don't want to cut them off, and make it look like I don't care. So I accept that behavior, because it might also provide useful background information. On the other hand, though, I use it as an opportunity to remind them that I am not conducting an investigation, and that even if they were to convince me that they are absolutely right, that wouldn't resolve this particular conflict. I say something like: "Yes, I appreciate the information that you are giving me, and it will be helpful to my understanding. Remember, though, my role is to get you together with the other side and to see how we can resolve this. So thank you for the information, and it will help me understand some of the dynamics, and maybe point me toward other questions that I need to ask." Then I have to hope that they'll understand that I don't need the documentation. If they ask if I want all their documents I usually say, "Yes, that's helpful, but if you can't find it or can't prove it to me, I don't need the whole paper trail that you have. Documentation is not going to change the dynamics of what I am trying to do here." Eventually I think people catch onto that.

Question:
Now, is that primarily true of minority communities or do you see the same thing on the establishment side?

Answer:
I see that to some extent, on both sides. But remember that it is usually a minority community trying to prove a case against the authorities, so they would be the ones most likely to present their evidence. But I think to some extent, even the institutions do this (here I'm using the term "institutions" to apply to the city, county, police or whatever.) They may show me some of the records on the incident or will get studies that they have done or I'll see copies of their policy that prove that they are not racist. So you get some of the same dynamics on the institutional side, with perhaps less intensity. But you do get that on both sides, because everybody wants to prove that they are the good guys. So to the extent that they think they can document that, they will try to do so. Then I will say, "Well, even if I am convinced you are the good guys, what we now need to do is to convince the others that you are the good guys, too. When you both think that you are good guys, then I have done my job."

Question:
Is there anything else that you try to do in the initial meeting besides finding out what their view of the issue is?

Answer:
To some extent, I am already trying to lay the ground work for potential mediation. Now of course, the majority of the cases do not end up going to mediation! But let me give you an example. This could be any community. I go into the minority community and let's say that they are concerned about a racist school superintendent. So I will go in and say, "What's the problem?" They say, "We've got a racist superintendent." "What do you want to do?" I'll ask. "We want to get rid of him." That is their number one demand, get rid of the superintendent. So I go on. "Okay. So if you get rid of the superintendent, then what?" "Well," they say, "we will get a superintendent who isn't racist." "Fine," I reply, "but who hired the superintendent?" "The school board." "Okay. Who is going to hire the next superintendent?" "The school board." Now we're getting deeper into the issue. "Well, how can you be sure that you are not going to get another racist?" "We'll tell them that we don't want a racist." "But how do you know that he is not a racist?" I'll ask. "What are the kinds of things that this superintendent is doing that let you know that he or she is racist? What are you going to tell the board that will convince them so that they will not hire another racist?" "Okay," they'll say, changing their approach a bit, "we'll say we need somebody who hires more minority staff." Okay. Now we've gotten somewhere. So then I start writing on my flip chart if there is one. "Okay, so part of the problem is the hiring policies here," I'll say. "What else?" "Well, look at the discipline here. They are expelling and suspending far more minority kids than white kids." "Okay, so the discipline problem is an issue." I continue writing on the chart. By having that kind of discussion I am now helping the community to focus not on the individual, but on the existing policies that need to be changed. Because the reality is that even if they get a different superintendent, if he or she does the exact same thing as the one they have now, they haven't gotten anywhere. On the other hand, if the current superintendent can be persuaded to do things differently, the problems could be resolved. Now, of course, I'm not at that point yet with the group. But if the superintendent would change some behaviors if he would do certain things differently then he wouldn't be seen as a racist that needs to be replaced. Yet initially, the only option that the community sees is, "Get rid of the racist bastard and get somebody better." So when you start taking about what somebody better would look like and what the differences would be, we now begin to get some issues that I can then take to the superintendent. I can't just go and say, "They think you're a racist," because, obviously, the superintendent is not going to agree that he is a racist in most cases. But often, after some conversation, the superintendent does agree that his job would be easier if he had a better relationship with the community. And even though this is just a small, minute trouble-making part of the community it always is [in the superintendent's view] he begins to realize that his job would be easier if his relationship with them was better. So if I can show him that I can maybe improve relations with that community, and he is willing to talk about some of the hiring policies and the disciplining procedures, then I have something I can work with. If we can talk about those issues, rather than whether or not he is a racist even though I haven't talked about mediation a whole lot yet I have begun to lay the groundwork for identifying what some of the actual interests are. This shows that the frustration isn't so much the one person as it is with what's happening to the children of that community. And by helping them to define that, I am also helping them to address it.

Question:
So how do you bring that up to the superintendent when you go into his or her office? How do you say, "These guys have a problem with some of your policies? "

Answer:
Well, I start by saying, "I'm from the Federal Government and I'm here to help you." Then he, of course, tells me that he is being strictly fair, non-racist, equal-opportunity, that he treats everybody fairly and so on. I never argue with him, but I do try to get across to him that as long as there is a perception in the community that he is not being fair and that some of the policies are not fair, then he is going to continue to have a conflict with the community. I ask, "Wouldn't it be in your best interests if you could develop a more cooperative relationship with the community?" And it is interesting. Very often the representative from the institution, in this case the superintendent, is just afraid of not being able to communicate with that group. "Those radicals, you can't talk to them, they have made up their minds, they don't want to listen to reason." So if I can provide him a setting where there can be communication, where I promise that they will listen to him, just as he will listen to them, and I promise that I will keep it under control and it will not get out of hand, he'll [probably accept that]. Sometimes I am surprised at how valuable of a process or how valuable of an opportunity that sort of situation can be for someone like a superintendent.

Question:
Do they recognize that ahead of time?

Answer:
Yes. It takes some persuasion, but most people want to do the right thing. Sometimes it is hard to convince the community people of that, but I have frequently found that the administrators or chiefs feel sorry for themselves. They feel totally misunderstood. You know, "Poor me, nobody understands me. Those people clobber me in the media and so does everybody else. I'm not really getting a fair deal here." So I have found that just spending time listening and understanding what some of their problems are goes a long way towards developing some credibility with the institutional representative. Eventually, they begin to think, "You know, maybe this woman really can help me." So then they are willing to give it that chance. I am